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Abstract
In a well-developed capital market, rents will be capitalized in
the prices of the firm's outstanding securities. To avoid the dif-
ficulties of using accounting rates of return to measure rents, we use
capitalized market values in relation to the replacement cost of the
firm's capital stock, a measure known as "Tobin's q." Following Bain's
and other more recent entry barrier classifications, we find q ratios
significantly above unity for only the "very high" barrier. Further,
we find the aforementioned classification scheme of entry barriers much
more useful than concentration ratio in describing cross-sectional
variation in q ratios. Only for the very high barrier group has con-
centration ratio added any explanatory power and the observed rela-
tionship is negative .
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Barriers to Entry, Concentration, and Tobin's q Ratio
I. Introduction
One of the central issues in industrial organization is the rela-
tionship between concentration and excess returns. One line of reason-
ing holds that concentration fosters collusion and allows firms to earn
monopoly rents. The empirical evidence of the association between
measures of concentration and excess returns is mixed leaving no con-
sensus about the strength of the association.
Concentration is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
above normal rates of return. It is easy to imagine technological,
cost, and demand conditions that result in industry demand being satis-
fied by one or a few producers. If there were no barriers to entry,
extant producers would earn only normal returns even though the industry
might be viewed as "concentrated."
Another line of reasoning attributed by Bain (1956) holds that in
the absence of barriers to entry oligopolists may practice limit pricing
to discourage entry. With low barriers to entry, the industry price
would approach the competitive price and generate no excess returns for
producers even in the presence of seller concentration. At the other
extreme with very high barriers to entry, Bain conjectured that the
limit price would approach the monopoly price. Thus, Bain hypothesized
a direct relationship between the magnitude of entry barriers and profit
rates. The role of seller concentration is a subordinate one: given
high barriers to entry the additional influence of concentration is to
foster collusion and cooperative pricing.
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The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate
whether the classification scheme of entry barriers provided by Bain
(1956), Mann (1966, 1970), Shephard (1970), and Palmer (1974) are asso-
ciated with cross-sectional excess returns. Second, we seek to deter-
mine if entry barrier classifications are more useful than concentration
in explaining excess returns.
Previous work along these lines has relied on accounting data and
periodic rate of return data. Since accounting income is not a concept
closely related to economic income and since periodic income is short-
run in nature, we prefer to use the capitalized values of rents as
measured by Tobin's q ratios. Using capital market prices we find that
industries previously classified as having "very high" barriers to entry
do indeed earn above normal returns. Firms in industries classified as
having "substantial" or "low to moderate" barriers earn normal returns.
Furthermore we find that published entry barrier classifications are
better predictors of capitalized rents than concentration ratios. The
only significant relationship between capitalized rents and concentra-
tion occurs in the very high entry barrier group and the relationship
is negative instead of positive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
the rationale for using capitalized values to measure monopoly rents so
as to avoid using accounting rate of return measures. Section III
describes the data, the estimation of Tobin's q ratios, and the published
classifications of industries by barriers to entry. The methodology and
empirical results are presented in Section IV. Concluding remarks are
presented in Section V.
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II. Rationale for Using Capital Market Data
A particularly thorny empirical issue is how to measure excess
returns on monopoly rents. Many earlier attempts have used accounting
rates of return, e.g., the ratio of accounting income to the book value
of total assets or equity. Accounting rates of return present three
problems: (1) they are not economic rates of return, (2) they reflect
past information instead of looking to the future, and (3) they are not
adjusted for risk to account for differential risk premia embedded in
market-determined opportunity costs.
The failure of accounting rates of return to correspond to a meaning-
ful measure of the economic rate of return is well-documented in Fisher
and McGowan (1983). Accounting income is the product of a set of arbi-
trary rules for revenue and expense recognition and cost allocations
that leave individual firms a degree of latitude in their reporting pro-
cedures. Asset values reflect historical costs less allocated deprecia-
tion charges instead of replacement cost. Similarly, inventory valuation
procedures bear little resemblance to replacement cost. With both the
numerator (income) and denominator (assets) subject to question, one can
put little faith in the rate of return ratio.
The second problem is that accounting rates of return are historical
in nature and may not be indicative of long-run equilibrium conditions.
For example, an increase in demand may allow existing firms to earn above
competitive returns that are competed away as entry occurs. Short-run
rates of return would not capture the effect of future entry. On the
other hand, profitable future growth opportunities would not be reflected
in current rate of return data. Even averaging of the data over just a
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few years may not reflect a firm's ability to exercise and protect its
market power in the long-run.
The third problem is that accounting rates of return fail to account
for risk-adjusted opportunity costs. That is, even if accounting data
adequately proxied for the true rate of return one would still need a
benchmark, or "normal," rate of return to measure monopoly returns. If
we define p. as the true rate of return on capital for firm i and r. as
the capital market opportunity cost for investments in the same risk
class as firm j, the measure of excess return, or "spread," is
e. = P. - r.. (1)
J J J
Thus to use rate of return data one must separately estimate the risk-
adjusted normal rate of return, r.. Even with a model of capital market
equilibrium such as the capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964),
Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) this is no trivial task.
To overcome the difficulties of using rate of return data we use
capital market values of the firm to measure rents. To see the relation-
ship, assume for simplicity that the firm is expected to earn the rate
of return p. in perpetuity, the replacement cost of the capital stock is
K., and the risk-adjusted opportunity cost r. is constant through time.
2
In this simple perpetuity case," the value of the firm, denoted V., is
given by
P.K.
V. = -J-JL (2)
or
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P.-r.
J 1V. = K. + — J-K.. (2 1 )
J J r. J
Thus Che value of the firm is the sum of the value of its capital stock
and the discounted value of any rents it earns. Expressing the value
of the firm as a ratio to the replacement cost of its capital stock, we
have a measure known as "Tobin's q,"
V. p.-r.
The amount by which q. exceeds unity serves as a measure of capitalized
rents.
This measure was identified by Tobin (1969, 1978) and Tobin and
Brainard (1968, 1977) in connection with monetary policy/control as the
nexus between financial markets and the markets for goods and services.
Recently, Lindenberg and Ross (1981) have used Tobin's q as a measure
of monopoly rents. The essence of their argument is that for competi-
tive firms, one would expect q to be close to unity. A q ratio above
unity would in the absence of barriers to entry attract new entrants,
driving q in the direction of unity. On the other hand, a monopolist
protected by barriers to entry would have any monopoly rents capitalized,
the market value of the firm would exceed the replacement cost of its
capital stock, and q would persist above unity.
The use of capitalized market values avoids the three problems
associated with periodic accounting rates of return. Market values are
objective values free of accounting procedures, they reflect expecta-
tions about long-run industry entry conditions, and they are risk-adjusted
present values. Consequently, our tests of the relationship between
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entry barriers and the ability of firms in high barrier industries to
earn rents should be more powerful.
While the market values used in the numerator of the q ratio pre-
sent no difficulty, the replacement cost of the capital stock in the
denominator is more troublesome. Firms may possess firm-specific re-
sources that are valuable for their cost-reducing capabilities. To the
extent that these resources are not carried on the books of the company,
the replacement cost of the capital stock will be understated. The
returns to these specialized resources will generate ordinary Ricardian
rents that will be capitalized in the market value of the firm. Thus,
the q ratio will reflect both these rents and any monopoly rents the
firm earns. Consequently the excess of q above unity will provide only
an upper bound on the magnitude of monopoly rents and will coincide
exactly with monopoly rents only in the absence of Ricardian rents.
III. Estimations of Variables and the Data
A. Calculating Tobin's q Ratio
The firm's q ratio is the ratio of the firm's market value to the
replacement cost of its assets. The market value of the firm is the
sum of three components: common stock, preferred stock, and debt.
Assets may also be subdivided into three components: plant and equip-
ment, inventory, and other assets. In measuring q ratios, we rely pri-
marily upon the methodology of Lindenberg and Ross (1981), who have
described their computational procedures in detail.
Market value of common stock at year end prices is readily available,
however "Compustat" provides only the book value of preferred stock. To
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approximate the market value of preferred stock, preferred dividends for
the year are divided by Standard and Poor's preferred stock yield index.
Calculating the market value of debt, given only book values, is
more difficult. To do so, we assume that all bonds have a 20-year matur-
ity, and offer a yield equal to the corporate average (at the time of
issuance) for new issues of its rating. Using the method of Lindenberg
and Ross, we can approximate the fractions of total debt which were
3
issued in each of the preceeding 20 years. The present value of debt
issued in each of those years can then be calculated straightforwardly,
given knowledge of the yield of those bonds and the current yield on
4
bonds of identical rating.
For the denominator of q, we must calculate the replacement costs
of capital assets. To calculate the replacement cost series for plant
and equipment, we assume that in 1963, our base year, the replacement
cost of plant and equipment was equal to the book value of net plant and
equipment. For succeeding years, we adjust replacement cost to account
for new investment, depreciation, and inflation, according to the fol-
lowing formula:
1 + 4
RCP„ = RCP_ . (- - ; ) + I t = 1964,..., 1976 (4)t t—1 l + o t
RCP = Replacement cost of plant and equipment.
$ = Rate of growth of capital goods prices (calculated
from the price deflator for the fixed investment
component of GNP).
5 Rate of depreciation (assumed fixed at .05).
I = Investment in new plant and equipment.
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The depreciation rate of 5% is arbitrary, but conforms to the choice of
Tobin and Brainard (1977).
We have again followed the example of Ross and Lindenberg in ad-
justing book value of inventory to reflect replacement costs. Adjust-
ments are made to account for the tendency of some inventory valuation
procedures to understate replacement costs in inflationary times. The
specific adjustments made depend upon the choice of inventory valuation
method chosen by the individual firms.
The category "other" assets includes liquid assets, land, and in-
tangibles. Out of necessity we assume that the replacement costs of
assets in this category are equal to reported book values.
Tobin' s q may now be computed as the ratio of total market value
(of common stock, preferred stock and debt) to replacement costs (of
plant and equipment, inventories, and other assets). For the firms in
our sample, we have computed q ratios for each year from 1963 to 1976.
B. Barrier to Entry Classifications
We are interested in the relationship between capitalized rents and
the height of barriers to entry. Entry conditions determine the extent
to which existing firms can collectively exercise market power without
inducing a response from potential competitors. In the absence to entry
barriers, monopoly power cannot persist in the long run.
To assess the extent of entry barriers we rely upon earlier studies.
The seminal work of Bain (1956) classified a sample of 20 manufacturing
industries into three barrier categories: low-moderate, substantial,
and very high barriers to entry. This classification scheme has been
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extended and updated by Shephard (1970), Mann (1966, 1970) and Palmer
(1974). Since these data have been widely studied in previous market
structure/profits studies, their use will allow comparison of our re-
sults to earlier work. Thus we take the data as given and do not
attempt verification or modification of the industry classifications.
Appendix A contains the list of industries and barrier categories.
C. Sample
The sample consists of 127 firms taken from Standard and Poor's
"Compustat" file. To be included, a firm must have sufficient data for
the years 1963 to 1976 to compute q ratios and it must be in an industry
for which we are able to obtain a barrier to entry classification from
the previously cited sources.
IV. Empirical Results
Before testing the formal hypotheses, we present the average q
ratios for each entry barrier category in Table 1. The point estimates
for 1972 are .965 for the low-moderate barrier (LMB) group, 1.068 for
the substantial barrier (SB) group, and 2.868 for the very high barrier
(VHB) group. Using individual firm averages for the period 1963-76, the
group means are .943, 1.062, and 2.467, respectively. (Henceforth, only
the 1972 estimates are discussed due to the consistency of the 1963-76
average estimates. Both are reported in the accompanying tables, how-
ever.)
Insert Table 1
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The formal hypothesis states that the LMB should have q ratios
close to unity and that q should increase with the height of barriers
to entry. Table 2 reports the results of the regression of q on bar-
rier to entry dummy variables D for the SB group and D
?
for the VHB
group. The intercept a is not significantly different from unity as
predicted. For the SB group a is positive but insignificant indicating
no significant difference in q ratios for the LMB and SB groups. For
the VHB group the coefficient a is significant at the 1% level. The
highest barrier group is distinct from the other two groups in that the
q ratios for this group are significantly above unity. The barrier
classifications explain 31.9% of the cross-sectional variation in q
ratios which is significant at the 1% level.
Insert Table 2
While the barrier classifications have significant explanatory
power, one might expect that barriers are also associated with seller
concentration. The natural question is whether the barrier groupings
are more closely associated with q than measures of seller concentra-
tion. A commonly used measure of concentration is the 4-firm, 4-digit
concentration ratio which is the percentage of the value of total
industry shipments accounted for by the four largest firms. Using 1972
concentration data we regress q against the concentration ratio and
report the results in Table 3.
Insert Table 3
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In the first specification, we test for a linear relationship with
the concentration ratio (CR) measured as a continuous variable. The
continuous CR variable has insignificant explanatory power and accounts
o
for only 1.0% of the variation in q.
Of course, there is no reason to believe that a continuous concen-
tration measure captures the underlying relationship. Meehan and
Duchesneau (1973) report evidence of a "critical level" of concentration
above which greater concentration has no effect. Using a cut-off of
CR < 50% we partitioned our sample into two approximately equal sub-
samples. The second set of regressions in Table 3 include a dummy
variable for the high concentration group. The dichotomous concentra-
tion measure shows a positive but insignificant association with q and
9
produces results no better than the continuous concentration measure.
At this point we must conclude that concentration ratios show no
significant association with the capitalized values of rents. This is
in sharp contrast to the strong association we find for the entry bar-
rier classifications. While concentration ratios offer no explanatory
power across the broad sample this does not rule out the possibility of
significant influences within separate barrier categories.
Table 4 presents a two-way analysis of variance using the three bar-
rier categories and the two concentration categories. As expected the
barrier effect is significant but the concentration effect is not. More
importantly the interaction term between barriers and concentration is
significant and adds to the explanatory power of the statistical model.
Insert Table 4
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To investigate the interaction effect more thoroughly we estimate
the regression reported in Table 5 which includes the barrier dummy
variables and the interaction terms which are the products of the
barrier variables and the continuous concentration variables. The co-
efficients for the interaction terms are negative for all three barrier
groups. For the LMB and SB groups the interaction is insignificant but
for the VHB group it is negative and significant at the 1% level. The
inclusion of the interaction terms improves the explanatory power of
the model.
Insert Table 5
The results in Table 5 confirm that the VHB group is distinct from
the lower barrier groups. First, the highest barrier group is the only
group which shows q ratios significantly above one, i.e., market values
well in excess of the replacement cost of the capital stock. Second,
it is the only group which shows any significant effect of concentration,
Interestingly, high concentration has a negative association with profit-
ability in the high barrier group of firms.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Earlier concentration/profits studies have relied on accounting
rate of return data which may not correspond with economic rates of
return. In this paper, we use capitalized market values which corre-
spond more closely to economic concepts. In addition, in an efficient
capital market these values will reflect long-run above normal returns
and require no adjustment for risk. Expressing the value of the firm
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as a ratio to the replacement cost of the capital stock, a Tobin's q
ratio, we are able to place an upper bound on monopoly rents.
Empirically, we find a very strong relationship between published
barrier to entry categories and Tobin's q ratios for our sample of 127
firms. By contrast, we find virtually no statistical association be-
tween q ratios and concentration measured either as a continuous vari-
able or as a critical threshold dichotomous variable. The only signi-
ficant relationship we found for concentration, is that for the very
high barrier to entry class q ratios decline with concentration.
The magnitudes of the q ratios are interesting as well. In a com-
petitive industry with no barriers to entry we would expect q to tend
towards unity. For the low to moderate entry group the average q is
not significantly different from unity which provides a check of the
computational methods. The substantial barrier to entry group have
slightly higher q ratios but the increase is insignificant. Only the
very high barrier group have q ratios significantly above unity. The
average q for this group is 2.868.
One must be careful in interpreting the excess of the q ratio above
unity as a measure of monopoly rents. To the extent that these firms
possess specialized resources whose values are not capitalized on the
books of the firm but which are capitalized by the capital market, q
will reflect both monopoly and Ricardian rents. At best q is an upper
bound on monopoly rents. Nevertheless the average q of 2.868 for the
very high barrier group is extraordinary. This implies that the repla-
cement cost of the capital stock is a mere 35% of the total market value.
Uncapitalized resources would have to account for an incredible 65% of
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the typical firm's value to suggest that a q ratio of 2.868 does not
reflect the presence of any monopoly rents. Furthermore, we are hard
pressed to explain why such significant omissions of Ricardian factors
are present only in industries classified by Bain, Shephard, Mann, and
Palmer as having very high entry barriers. Instead we interpret our
findings as showing at least some monopoly rents accruing to firms in
the highest barrier group.
Our findings would seem to have some bearing for antitrust enforce-
ment. Measures of concentration do not serve as accurate indicators of
the ability of firms to earn monopoly returns as measured by capita-
lized market values. There is no statistical association to support
the view that high concentration and high long-run profits are asso-
ciated. In fact, we find capitalized rents only in the very high
barrier group in which concentration has a negative and significant
* J •, . . . , .10statistical association with q ratios.
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FOOTNOTES
For a comprehensive review of this literature see Weiss (1974) and
Scherer (1980).
2
The level perpetuity case is used solely for expositional conveni-
ence. In an efficient capital market the value of the firm will reflect
future returns regardless of the pattern of cashflows or growth oppor-
tunities. See Miller and Modigliani (1961).
3
The book value of new long-term debt issued in year t can be
calculated as follows:
LD -ID ,+RD,ifLD - LD ,+RD >0
I t t-1 t ' t t-1 t —N = {
0, if LD - LD + RD <*
t t-1 t
where N = Book value of long-term debt issued in year t.
LD = Book value of total long-term debt outstanding in year t.
RD Amount of long-term debt retired in year t.
The fraction of total long-term debt outstanding in year t which was
issued in year t-j is therefore given by F .
:
t > t~ 2
'
j = 1,...,18t,t-j 18
Z N .
k=0
c"k
Note that debt issued in year t - 19 is classified as current rather
than long-term debt in year t.
4
The market value at time t of all outstanding debt is given by the
formula below:
MVD
t
= DS
c
+ DL
t
1
q
F
t;t_.[(V ./bc )(l - (1 + b^ 20"^)
+ (1 b^ 20"^]
where MVD = The market value of outstanding debt at time t.
DS = The book value of short-term debt.
DL = The book value of outstanding long-term debt at time t.
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b = The yield on corporate bonds of the appropriate rating
issued at time t.
F = The fraction of total long-terra debt outstanding in year
' t which was issued in year t- j
.
Our method of estimating the replacement cost of assets differs
from that of Lindenberg-Ross, who made corrections to account for tech-
nical obsolence as well as ordinary depreciation. They also relied on
accounting data to estimate depreciation rates, rather than assuming a
uniform depreciation rate.
According to the LIFO (last in-first out) valuation, it is assumed
that output sold is that most recently purchased (or produced). Hence
the reported value of inventories will be understated in times of per-
sistent inflation. We make the following adjustment:
P .5(P + P )
RINV = RINV (- ) + (BI - BI ) • ( )
t-1 t-1
where RINV = Replacement cost of inventory.
P = The wholesale price index.
BI = Book value of Inventory.
According to the average cost valuation method, inventories at time
t are reported in terms of prices which, according to Lindenberg-Ross
(1981, p. 15) are "roughly an averagae of prices at t-1 and t." Thus,
the following correction is made:
RINV
t
= BV .5(P
t
+ ¥^f
No corrections are made for other inventory valuation methods.
Tobin's q ratios have been kindly provided to us by Chappell and
Cheng (1982).
g
This finding is consistent with Lindenberg and Ross (1981), and
Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1983). We also tested for a quadra-
tic relationship and found no improvement in the regression results.
9
We tried other critical concentration cut-off points with no im-
provement.
10
Traditionally, concentration is alleged to reduce the cost of
collusion and cooperative pricing. Under this traditional hypothesis
it would seem that concentration should have a positive effect on
profits that is most easily detected in the high barrier group least
threatened by potential entrants. For other evidence inconsistent with
the traditional hypothesis see Lindenberg and Ross (1981), and Smirlock,
Gilligan, and Marshall (1983).
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APPENDIX A
List of Industries and Barrier Categories
# of Firms
Low Barrier to Entry
Meatpacking 3
Canned fruits and vegetables 4
Woolen and cotton textiles 5
Clothing 6
Wooden furniture 3
Paperboard products 15
Footwear 3
Cement 4
43
Moderately-High Barrier to Entry
Sugar 2
Lumber 6
Inorganic chemical 2
Petroleum refining 13
Aluminum 7
Gypsum products 1
Large household appliances 4
Synthetic rubber 4
Construction machinery 6
45
High Barrier to Entry
Distilled liquors 4
Ethical drugs 9
Soaps 4
Newspapers 1
Flat glass 2
Computing and relating machines 10
Industrial controls 2
Automobiles 4
Photographic equipment
_3_
39
Table 1
Average q-Ratios for Overall Sample and by Barrier Co Entry
Classification (1972 Estimates and 1963-76 Average Estimates)
Low-Moderate Substantial Very High
Overall Entry Entry Entry
Estimation Sample Barriers Barriers Barriers
Period (N=127) (N=43) (N=45) (N=39)
1972 1.586 .965 1.068 2.868
(.447) (.681) (2.078)
1963-76 1.454 .943 1.062 2.467
(average) (.312) (.439) (1.561)
t
Cross-sectional standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2
Dummy Variable Regression Results for q versus Barriers to Entry
Model: q = a. + a, D, + ct?D
?
+ e
where 1 if substantial barriers to entry
Di=f
otherwise
1 if very high barrier to entry
otherwise
2
Estimation & ft, & R F
Period
1972 .965 .102 1.903 .319 29.06**
(5.01)** (.38) (6.81)**
1963-76 .943 .119 1.524 .350 33.44**
(average) (6.63)** (.60) (7.39)**
t-statistics in parentheses.
**signif icance level exceeds 1%.
Table 3
Regression Results for q versus Four Firm Concentration Ratios
Model 1: q = a + a , CR + e
Model 2: q = a + a D, + e
where
1 if CR > 50% (N=65)
if CR < 50% (N=62)
Estimation »
Model Period a a R
1972 1.197 .805 .010 1.21
(3.17)** (1.10)
1963-76 1.004 .930 .023 2.88
(average) (3.54)** (1.70)
1972 1.544 .087 .001 .10
(8.16)** (0.32)
1963-76 1.380 .152 .004 .55
(average) (9.67)** (0.74)
t-statistics in parentheses.
**significance level exceeds 1%.
Table 4
Two Way ANOVA for Effects of Entry Barriers
and Concentration on q-Ratios
Barrier Class Concentration Class
Average q-Ratios
1963-76
1974 (average) N_
Low-Moderate
Substantial
Very High
CR < 50%
CR > 50%
CR < 50%
CR > 50%
CR < 50%
CR > 50%
.979 .957 39
.835 .811 4
.977 .990 15
1.112 1.099 30
4.319 3.410 11
2.299 2.098 28
R* .43 .43
ANOVA F-ratios :
Overall 18.33** 18.51**
Barrier Effect 33.93** 37.41**
Concentration Effect .17 .94
Interaction 11.80** 8.40**
**Signif icance level greater than 1%.
Table 5
Regression Results for q versus Entry Barriers
and Four Firm Concentration Ratios
Model: q - a + a D + a D
2
+ a DQ
• CR + a D • CR + a D • CR + e
where
1 if Low-Moderate Entry Barriers
otherwise
1 if Substantial Entry Barriers
Di=f
otherwise
1 if Very High Entry Barriers
otherwise
Estimation
A A A A A A
Period aA a, a„ a_ a. a c R F12 3 4 5
1972 1.119 .052 5.431 -0.005 -0.002 -0.059 .45 19.63**
(1.93) (0.06) (5.88)**(-0.28) (-0.18) (-5.30)**
1963-76 0.976 0.078 3.929 -0.001 0.000 -0.039 .45 19.70**
(Average) (2.23)* (0.12) (5.63)**(-0.08) (0.02) (-4.65)**
t
t-statistics in parentheses.
*significance level exceeds 5%.
**significance level exceeds 1%.


